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Abstract 
A prospective disease group-based payment is a reimbursement rule used in a wide array of 
countries. It turns to be the hospital’s payment rule to imply.  The secret of this payment is a fee 
payment as well as a hospital’s activity based payment. There is a consensus to consider this rule 
of payment as the least likely to be manipulated by the actors. However, the defined fee per 
group depends on recorded information that is then processed using complex algorithms. What if 
the data itself can be manipulated? The result would be a fee per group based on manipulated 
factors that would lead to an inefficient budget allocation between hospitals. Using a unique 
French longitudinal database with 145 million stays, I unambiguously demonstrate that the 
implementation of a finer classification led to a up-coding. The end result has been a budget 
transfer from public non-research hospitals to for-profit hospitals. This budget reallocation did 
not correspond to any change in the actual production of care. 
 
Résumé 
Les établissements hospitaliers français sont tous tarifés par Groupe Homogène de Séjours 
(GHS) depuis 2008. Ce mode de tarification est aujourd’hui largement adopté par l’ensemble des 
pays de l’OCDE. Toutefois, une tarification à 100% par forfait par séjour fait aujourd’hui débat 
en France. Les indicateurs de qualité semblent orthogonaux à la rémunération définie. Afin de 
prendre en compte plus finement la sévérité des patients, la classification des GHS a été 
multipliée par 3. A partir d’une base de données originale de 145 millions d’observations, nous 
sommes à même de comparer le comportement de codage avant la mise en place de cette 
nouvelle classification et après la mise en place de cette nouvelle classification. Nous montrons 
que les établissements de santé se sont adaptés à cette nouvelle classification en changeant leur 
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comportement de codage. Ce changement de codage est intervenu sans modification de la 
production réel de soins. Suivant le type d’établissement, l’adaptation au codage diffère. La 
tarification étant à enveloppe fermée, nous montrons une réallocation du budget vers les 
établissements à but lucratifs au détriment des établissements publics hors établissements de 
recherche. 
 
 
key findings/implications of the manuscript 
1- implementation of a finer classification led to a up-coding 
2- At short term, a budget transfer from public non-research hospitals to for-profit hospitals 
3- This budget reallocation did not correspond to any change in the actual production of care 
 
Keywords: Hospital stays, Diagnosis-related groups (DRGs), Upcoding, manipulated database, 
heterogeneity in responses 
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From down-coding to up-coding: 
DRG based payment in hospitals 
 
Introduction 
Manipulating the data from patient’s health record during their stay in hospital is one way of 
shifting from one disease group (called DRG) to a more profitable one. Indeed, raw information 
manipulation allows coding changes to generate additional payment unrelated to the needs of 
patients (Steinwald and Dummit, 1989). In this paper, I use a database that has undergone a 
change in the logic of construction of DRGs, the number of groups increasing from around 800 
to 2,200. This shift in classification logic created a natural experiment for testing whether French 
hospitals tend to enhance profit by taking advantage of regulatory loopholes through a behavior 
of upcoding (from an initial down-coding context). I also examine the heterogeneity in the 
response of hospitals to this change in coding structure.  
While DRG-based hospital payment systems may provide adequate reimbursement for the 
average patient within each DRG, they overpay hospitals for patients with below-average 
resource consumption and underpay for patients with above-average cost. In order to avoid 
creating perverse incentives, which could lead to patient selection or a priori treatment choices, 
DRG payments are adjusted to the expected cost of a patient stay. But studies in various 
countries, including France, have found that DRG classification did not explain all of the 
variation in cost between different stays (Hakkinen et al., 2012; Mason et al., 2012; Milcent, 
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2017). While upcodingi behavior is widely studied with the US hospitals, we know almost 
nothing when healthcare is mainly provided by the public sector, as it is the case in France.  
To improve the granularity of reimbursement, DRG classifications have often been refined over 
time. Refinements usually consist in splitting a single DRG category into more DRG categories 
related to the same primary diagnosis. The current debate in the United States on the potential 
impact of further refinement of DRGs for certain hospitals is instructive. A study carried out for 
MedPAC in 2005 demonstrated, for a given DRG, large variations in profitability: DRGs relating 
to surgery were found to be more profitable than those for medical treatments, notably for 
orthopaedic and cardiovascular care. On one hand, this led to the idea that a refinement in the 
classification would improve the payment system by better capturing differences in the severity 
of treated cases. The logic is straightforward. Highly disaggregated payment systems only offer 
an incentive to produce the highly disaggregated product at minimum cost. There is no incentive 
to make efforts to economize on the number or variety of disaggregated services (Newhouse, 
2002; Newhouse, 2003; Cash et al., 2003). On the other hand, refinement increased the 
complexity of the DRG classification, requiring a very detailed and sophisticated information 
system, with an increased risk of mispayment if the information is not accurate.  
This article studies the impact of a decision by French policy makers to refine the DRG 
classification in 2009 by introducing levels of severity, and, as a consequence multiplying by 
three the number of DRG groups. For internal purposes, the French health statistics agency used 
the new 2009-classification of the algorithm to classify stays before and after the implementation 
of this new classification. With this unique database, I identify changes in hospitals’ coding 
practices without any confounding effects. I was thus able to “go back in time”. I assessed the 
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change in behavior, i.e. changes of the raw information only due to change in the DRG 
classification. Besides, I distinguished this behavior change according to the type of hospitals. 
I find an unambiguous upcoding of the raw information as hospitals’ response to a refinement of 
the DRG classification. This upcoding consists in changes in hospital record-keeping practices in 
order to increase case-mix indices and reimbursements. The probability of being coded as non-
severe decreased by about 2.1%. These results are consistent when controlling for pathology 
indicators and hospital fixed effects: hospitals are sensitive to the financial incentives created by 
the DRG classification. I also find that hospitals’ response to the refinement of the DRG 
classification system depended on hospital ownership. For-profit hospitals were more sensitive to 
the financial incentives created by this change in DRG classification logic. Public non-research 
hospitals were the least sensitive to the change. An implication of these results is a budget 
reallocation that went to for-profit hospitals at the expense of public non-research hospitals. 
The paper is organized into five sections. Section 2 presents the implications of activity-based 
pricing (T2A). It introduces a hospital objective function, which provides the theoretical 
framework for the empirical sections that follows. Section 3 presents the database, and the results 
in Section 4. Section 5 presents robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 presents concluding 
remarks. 
The implications of activity-based pricing 
This research contributes to the literature on providers in healthcare (Ellis and McGuire, 1986; 
Pope, 1989; Ma, 1994, 1998; Chalkley and Malcomsom, 2000; Mougeot and Naegelen, 2008; 
Brekke et al., 2011). Models of hospital behaviour predict that hospitals will respond to a change 
in the refinement of DRG classification by trying to increase revenue per stay. More thorough 
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coding of secondary diagnoses and procedures is an intended effect of the introduction of DRG-
based hospital payment systems, but the risk is that hospitals attempt to increase revenues 
through fraudulent coding practices, leading to unjustified payments (Simborg, 1981; Steinbusch 
et al., 2007; Silverman and Skinner, 2004). Kuhn and Sicilliani (2008) assume that providers can 
increase demand by increasing quality but can also inflate activity through a manipulative effort.  
Most of the attention in the empirical literature has focused on how hospitals respond to price 
changes (Silverman et al., 1999; Silverman and Skinner, 2004 ; Xirasagar, 2006; Brekke et al. 
2012). Gilman (2000) investigated the impact of a 1994 reform of Medicaid DRGs for HIV 
diagnoses in New York. He found that DRG fee changes led to changes in length of stay. These 
results suggest that hospitals make DRG-specific changes in intensity of care in response to price 
changes. Researchers have attempted to measure the role of upcoding in increased case-mix 
indices in US Medicare (Carter and Ginsburg, 1985; Hsia et al., 1988; Carter et al., 1990). Dafny 
(2005) exploited a 1988 policy reform that generated large price changes in Medicare 
admissions. She found that the upcoding response was stronger among for-profit hospitals. 
Barros and Braun (2013), following Dafny (2005), explored the link between upcoding and price 
increases in the context of a national health service (that of Portugal). Sacarny (2016) uses the 
change in billing categories to estimate a model of technology adoption. Geruso and Layton 
(2015) used upcoding data to learn about the game between payers and providers. Using the 
French natural experiment, I study differences across hospitals in how they respond to the 2009 
policy, with the introduction of the severity level in the DRG classification, tripling the number 
of groups.  
Payment system in France 
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The French national health insurance scheme (Sécurité Sociale) is a single-payer system: this 
eliminates any concerns about potential cost-shifting behavior by providers, negotiation between 
providers and payers, or different reimbursement schemes for different patients. Reimbursements 
cover almost all medical services in hospitals, except an additional fixed fee per day for catering 
and accommodation in for-profit hospitals. 
 
How is the French hospital system structured? It consists of three types of hospitals: public, 
private for-profit, and private not-for-profit. Healthcare for in-patient is mainly provided by the 
public sector. This paper focuses on stays in acute care units. For these, for-profit private 
hospitals represent 25% of beds, while public hospitals make up two thirds of total beds. The 
remaining 8% of beds are in private non-profit institutions. In terms of stays, 36% of admissions 
are to for-profit private hospitals (DREES, 2012).iiUntil the 2000s, the public sector was largely 
immune from standard market forces pushing for production efficiency. Since 2008, a DRG-
based payment (T2A) has been the sole mode of reimbursement of health care institutions for all 
acute care stays, regardless of hospital type. However, according to the literature, for a same 
reimbursement rule, the hospital behavior differs. Dafny (2009, 2005) and Silverman (2004) find 
that for-profit hospitals or for-profit managers upcode more than hospitals of other ownership 
forms. It suggests that the upcoding strategies of for-profit hospitals vary from non-profit or 
government-owned hospitals, a prediction we consider in the empirical work that follows.  
Yardstick Competition in practice 
The T2A system of activity-based pricing is built on the theoretical model of Schleifer (1983). In 
this theoretical model, the payment rule is given ex ante and lump-sum transfers are calculated 
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ex post. Ex ante, the regulator announces to hospitals that they will receive a lump-sum transfer 
per DRG, whose amount is not yet established but which will correspond to the mean cost. This 
model thus makes payments dependent on the mean cost for a given DRG. Assuming hospitals 
and stays to be homogeneous, the cost variable that differs between stays is the hospital level of 
cost reduction effort. The unique feature of this model is its calculation of the transfer, consisting 
of the mean cost in all hospitals except the one receiving the payment. The lump-sum transfer 
received is thus exogenous to the hospital’s activity. Rational behavior in the context of payment 
by lump-sum transfer is to minimize costs in order to capture the rent between the lump sum and 
the actual cost. Here, this involves making the maximum effort for the minimum cost. All 
hospitals having the same rational behavior, the cost paid by all hospitals will be the minimum 
cost. The lump sum thus corresponds ex post to the minimum cost for a given DRG g. 
The pricing model currently in effect in France is defined for periods of one year. The rule is the 
following: at the end of the period, each hospital receives an amount of funding for the next 
period calculated on its activity over the past year. More specifically, each stay is associated to a 
DRG, which defines a certain quantity of care and a mean cost;iii i.e., a certain amount of 
hospital activity. A lump sum is associated to each stay classified under this DRG. At the end of 
the period, the hospital thus receives the total of the lump sums corresponding to its activity for 
the period. 
I now present the calculation of lump sums by DRG. Assuming hospitals to be rational agents, I 
explicitly derive the incentives that result from this financing mechanism. Let shg denote stay s 
associated to DRG g in hospital h; Shg denote the total number of admissions associated to DRG 
g in hospital h; Cshg denote the cost of a stay s associated to DRG g in hospital h; hg denote 
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hospital h having admitted at least one patient for a stay associated to DRG g; and Hg denote the 
number of hospitals having admitted at least one patient for a stay associated to DRG g. 
 
The mean cost for a DRG g is defined by:  
 
On the basis of the mean cost per DRG, a relative cost scale for the different DRGs can be 
defined. DRGs are thus ordered on a scale from the least costly to the most costly. DRGs can be 
expressed as a function of a reference DRG. The choice of reference DRG has no impact on the 
budget that the hospital receives at the end of the period. Then, a relative index is associated to 
each DRG. Let 𝐶! denote the mean cost of a stay s associated to DRG g; 𝐶!"#$  denote the mean 
cost of a stay s associated to the reference DRG, called gref . The relative index ig of a DRG g is 
defined by: 𝑖! = 𝐶! /𝐶!"#$ 
 
Payment per DRG & a fixed annual envelope 
Such a pricing system offers no way to control the volume of care. In France, we are in a context 
where the financial situation of the public system has declined since the 80s. The regulator 
cannot thus risk an uncontrolled increase in the volume of care. Besides, the period of pricing by 
global budget that preceded the implementation of PPS was a period of blind rationalization. The 
extent to which an insufficient supply of hospital care led to a rationing of demand cannot be 
determined.  
The pricing model currently in e↵ect in France is defined for periods of one year. The rule is the
following: at the end of the period, each hospital receives an amount of funding for the next period
calculated on its activity over the past year. More specifically, each stay is associated to a DRG, which
defines a certain quantity of care and a mean cost4; i.e., a certain amount of hospital activity. A lump
sum is associated to each stay classified under this DRG. At the end of the period, the hospital thus
receives the total of the lump sums corresponding to its activity for the period.
I now present the calculation of lump sums by DRG. Assuming hospitals to be rational agents, I
explicitly derive the incentives that result from this financing mechanism. Let shg denote stay s associated
to DRG g in hospital h; Shg denote the total number of admissions associated to DRG g in hospital h;
Cshg denote the cost of a stay s associated to DRG g in hospital h; hg denote hospital h having admitted
at least one patient for a stay s associated to DRG g; and Hg denote the number of hospitals having
admitted at least one patient for a stay s associated to DRG g.
The mean cost for a DRG g is defined by: Cg =
PHg
hg
PShg
shg=1
CshgPHg
hg=1
Shg
On the basis of the mean cost per DRG, a relative cost scale for the di↵erent DRGs can be defined.
Hospital pricing rests on a comparison of the relative costs of di↵erent DRGs and not on their absolute
cost. The lump sums per DRG are evaluated relative to one another. On DRG serves as a refer nce
(the DRG for vaginal delivery without complications). The other DRGs are situated with respect to this
reference DRG on the basis of their cost. DRGs are thus ordered on a scale from the least costly to the
most costly. DRGs can be expressed as a function of this reference DRG. For exampl : the ratio of the
cost of the DRG “hepatic transplants, level 1” to the cost of the reference DRG is calculated, yielding
a relative index. The relative index for the DRG “hepatic transplants, level 1,” for example, might be
equal to 3 times that of the DRG “vaginal delivery without complications.” A relative index is associated
to each DRG. The choice of reference DRG has no impact on the budget that the hospital receives at
the end of the period.
Let Cg denote the mean cost of a stay s associated to DRG g; Cgref denote the mean cost of a stay s
associated to the reference DRG, called gref . The relative index ig of a DRG g is defined by: ig =
Cg
Cgref
2.3 Payment per DRG in the French context
Such a pricing system o↵ers no way to control the volume of care. In France, we are in a context where
the financial situation of the public system has declined since the 80s. The regulator cannot thus risk an
uncontrolled increase in the volume of care.
4A transformation of the mean cost is actually used
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As a result, the logic of DRG-based pricing was joined by a fixed budget envelope mechanism. 
The law on the financing of social security (LFSS) determines the total budget for hospital 
spending over the course of the year. Thus, the mechanism is characterized by two lump sums: 
an exogenous, arbitrarily chosen global lump sum F for all hospitals, and a lump sum per stay s 
associated to a given DRG g, noted as fg. 
A hospital activity corresponds to the sum of the number of relative units for all stays. Total 
national hospital activity is defined in the same way, as the sum of relative units for all health 
care institutions in France. The value of the index is calculated as a simple ratio of the total sum 
of relative units produced by all health care institutions to the size of the overall envelope 
distributed to all institutions for the period. G represents the number of DRGs in the 
classification. 
According to Equation (1), the greater the amount of care produced by all healthcare institutions 
over the period, the lower the value of v, and thus the lower the reimbursement for a stay, ceteris 
paribus. The amount of the lump sum per DRG is the relative index multiplied by its monetary 
value: fg = igv. This lump sum per DRG thus depends on the activity of all healthcare institutions 
combined. 
Let gh denote DRG g associated to stays in hospital h, and Gh denote the total number of DRGs 
associated to stays in hospital h. On the basis of these definitions, the budget received by hospital 
h is thus: 
Besides, the period of pricing by global budget that preceded the implementation of PPS was a period
of blind rationalization. The extent to which an insu cient supply of hospital care led to a rationing
of demand cannot be determined. Healthcare authorities thus cannot anticipate what the volume of
demand would be under a pricing system that did not constrain it. Once again, the regulator cannot risk
an uncontrolled increase in the volume of care.
As a result, the logic of DRG-based pricing was accompanied by a fixed budget envelope mechanism.
The law on the financing of social security (LFSS) determines the total budget for hospital spending over
the course of the year. Thus, the mechanism is characterized by two lump sums: an arbitrarily chosen
global lump sum F for ll hospitals, and lump sum per stay s associated to a given DRG g, noted as
fg.
The key to the determination of this payment (the lump sums fg) is the fixed budget (or envelope)
defined by the law on the financing of social security (LFSS) and the activity of all hospitals.
Since hospital activity is a set of stays and each stay is associated to a DRG, the hospital’s total
activity can be quantified as a number of relative units. A hospital’s activity corresponds to the sum
of the number f relative units for all stays. Total national hospital activity can be defined in the same
way, as the sum of relative units for all health care institutions in France. The value of the index can be
calculated as a simple ratio of the total sum of relative units produced by all health care institutions to the
size of the overall envelope distributed to all institutions for the period. This envelope F is determined
by a vote in the French National Assembly. It is exogenous. G represents the number of DRGs in the
classification.
F =
GX
g=1
HgX
hg
ShgX
shg=1
igv which implies v =
FPG
g=1
PHg
hg
PShg
shg=1
ig
(1)
According to Equation (1), the greater the amount of care produced by all health care institutions
over the period, the lower the value of v, and thus the lower the reimbu se ent for a stay, ceteris paribus.
The amount of the lump sum per DRG is the relative index multiplied by its monetary value: fg = igv.
This lump sum per DRG thus depends on the activity of all healthcare institutions combined.
Let gh denote DRG g associated to stays in hospital h, and Gh denote the total number of DRGs
associated to stays in hospital h. On the basis of these definitions, the budget received by hospital h is
thus:
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The hospital’s objective function (with Ch the total costs of hospital h over the period) is: 
Here, all types of hospitals (state-owned hospitals, for profit hospitals and non-profit hospitals) 
are considered to have a single objective, revenue maximization. iv 
Implications 
The 2009-shift of classification with the DRG groups’ refinement was aiming at reducing the 
consequences of within-DRG cost heterogeneity, providing an alternative to outlier costs to the 
hospitals. The more DRGs are in the classification, the greater the distinguishability of the 
severity of cases. Consequently, the more refined the classification, the more closely relative 
units reflect the gravity of cases. The hospital, behaving rationally, seeks to maximize the 
number of relative units per stay. As a result, the more the classification system takes severity 
into account, the greater the incentive for hospitals to optimize the coding of admissions to 
associate them to DRGs which present the highest possible level of severity. The refinement 
issue has been theoretically studied in papers by Siciliani (2006), Hafsteindottir and Siciliani 
(2009), and Kuhn and Siciliani (2013). They provide a clear analysis of the upcoding 
phenomenon: Healthcare providers have interest in declaring more diagnoses which lead stays to 
be associated to high-severity DRGs when low-severity patients are less costly than high-severity 
patients. 
Bh =
GhX
gh=1
ShgX
shg=1
fg =
GhX
gh=1
ShgX
shg=1
igv = F ⇤
PGh
gh=1
PShg
shg=1
igPG
g=1
PHg
hg
PShg
shg=1
ig
(2)
The hospital’s objective function (with Ch the total costs of hospital h over the period) is:
Max F ⇤
PGh
gh=1
PShg
shg=1
igPG
g=1
PHg
hg
PShg
shg=1
ig| {z }
Bh
 
GhX
gh=1
SghX
sgh=1
Csgh| {z }
Ch
with Ch 6 Bh (3)
Here, all types of hospitals (state-owned hospitals, for profit hospitals and non-profit hospitals) are
considered to have a single objective, revenue maximization 5
2.4 Implications: Upcoding
There are some limitations on the applicability of Shleifer’s model to the French context. Yardstick
competition solves the moral hazard problem, but not the adverse selection problem due to patient
heterogeneity. In 2009, the French DRG classification system changed. In the shift of classification, the
number of groups increased from around 800 to 2200. Th s change of classification is characterized by a
change in the logic of the construction of DRGs. The refinement of the classification introduced four levels
of severity. This refinement was a way to reduce the consequences of within-DRG cost heterogeneity,
providing an alternative to outlier costs to the hospitals.
The more DRGs are in the classification, the greater the distinguishability of the severity of cases.
Consequently, the more refined the classification, the more closely relative units reflect the gravity of
cases. The hospital, behaving rationally, seeks to maximize the number of relative units per stay. As
a result, the more the classification system takes severity into account, the greater the incentive for
hospitals to optimize the coding of admissions to associate them to DRGs which present the highest
possible level of severity. The refinement issue has been theoretically studied in recent papers by Siciliani
(2006), Hafsteindottir and Siciliani (2009), and Kuhn and Siciliani (2013). They provide a clear analysis
of the upcoding phenomenon: Healthcare providers have interest in declaring more diagnoses which lead
stays to be associated to high-severity DRGs when low-severity patients are less costly than high-severity
patients.
5The French reimbursement system is discussed in Section 5.
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While demand is price-responsive in Shleifer’s model, French social security is a system of fully 
reimbursed insurance for inpatients, which leads to price-inelastic demand. The patient’s out-of-
pocket cost is negligible and independent of the level of DRG. This inelasticity may induce an 
increase in the number of stays. To limit this adverse effect, the French regulator has 
implemented a fixed budget (or envelope) mechanism, as presented in Section 2.2. Because of 
the fixed budget mechanism, there is no way for total cost to increase. Therefore, another way 
for a hospital to increase its budget is to increase the number of relative units per stay, that is 
upcoding. 
The objective function outlined above can easily be expanded to include upcoding effects. The 
number of relative units in hospital h can be redefined as an increasing function of the degree of 
upcoding. Upcoding can then result from maximization of the left hand member of equation (3) 
(hospital revenue), i.e., maximization of the relative index per stay ig. The practices of 
competitors may affect upcoding indirectly through pressure on hospital profits. Returning to 
equation (3), it is from the numerator of the left-hand member of Equation 3: the number of 
relative units of hospital h increases with the degree of upcoding (indirect channel); Or it may 
affect directly via the dissemination of upcoding practices. It means, from the denominator of the 
left-hand member of equation 3, the total number of relative units increases with the degree of 
dissemination of upcoding practices (direct channel). In the US, one former manager from the 
largest for-profit hospital chain, Columbia/HCA (now HCA), reported that hospital managers 
were rewarded for upcoding patients with these diagnoses into the more remunerative “with 
complications” codes (Lagnado, 1997). 
Data 
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Original data 
Whatever the hospital’s ownership, for each in-patient, primary diagnosis, the list of all 
secondary diagnoses, co-morbidities, and procedures performed, as well as all exploratory acts, 
are registered. This information is then sent to the national health statistics agencyv providing an 
exhaustive record of French hospitals. On the basis of this information, the national health 
statistics agency uses a grouper program to assign each stay to a DRG. Each year there is 
adaptive change of the grouper program. But, in 2009, there was a political decision of a 
rethinking of the French DRG classification. This classification switched from around 800 
groups to 2,200 groups. For internal purposes, the health statistics agency used the 2009-
classification of the algorithm to classify stays over the years 2006-2011.  
The database used here covers the period 2006 to 2011 with a total of 145 million stays. 
Preliminary statistic on the 2009-logic of the French DRG classification 
This new (2009) DRG classification is organized in a nested fashion. DRGs are coded by a series 
of 6 characters. The sixth character defines the level of severity —4 levels— or the absence of 
severity, as in the case of exploratory acts (for instance, chemotherapy sessions). viIn this paper, 
we focus on in-patient with level of severity from 1 to 4. The level of severity is independent 
from the procedures performed on the patient. 
The distribution by severity is as follows: 70% in level 1, 20% in level 2, 9% in level 3 and 2% 
in level 4. Public hospital stays were more spread out among severity levels than those in for-
profit institutions (Table 1). Among stays classified by severity level, fewer than two thirds of 
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stays in public healthcare institutions were of low severity, while in contrast, nearly four fifths of 
stays in for-profit hospitals were for a level of severity without complications (Table 1). 
The proportion of stays coded as low-severity decreased over time (Figure 1). An inflection – an 
acceleration in the downward tendency – can be observed in 2009. In parallel, the proportion of 
stays classified as moderate to very high severity increased over time, an increasing trend that 
became steeper after the reform. This change in the declining slope of 2009 is observed for all 
types of hospitals (research, other public, private non-profit, and private for-profit). 
---------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------- 
---------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------- 
 
Empirical strategy and results 
Econometric models 
In this paper, I check whether the refinement of a hospital stay classification system leads to 
upcoding from a possible initial situation of downcoding. As mentioned in Introduction, the data 
make it possible to “go back in time” and observe the consequences of the logic change in the 
DRG classification. For the years before 2009, the data include not only the diagnoses and 
exploratory procedures reported at the moment of the stay, but also the associated DRG 
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according to the 2009-shift in classification. Therefore, the analyses here are based on the level 
of severity that would have been associated to the stay in the 2009-change in the logic of 
classification, before it actually came into effect. Analysis of data from a 2006-2011 period is 
used to examine a potential upcoding independently of any changes in treatment.  
The explained variable Yiht is an indicator of the level of severity of stay i at hospital h at time t. 
Yiht = 1 if stay i is associated to a DRG of severity level 1. 
 
• Temporal effects are controlled by a trend variable t, coded from 0 to 5 (for years from 
2006 to 2011). Any macro changes that are common to hospital stays are picked up by 
this trend coefficient. The reference year is 2006. 
• The effect of the change in classification may also be explained by hospital-specific 
behaviors. βh are hospital effects. 
• Some hospitals may change in terms of activity or size over the period. To control for 
this, hospital fixed effects crossed with the trend (βh * t) are also included in the 
regression model. 
• As there may have been changes over the period in the practices recommended by 
physicians for some pathologies which could affect classification regardless of other 
incentives, I also control for pathology effects. βp are pathology effects. 
• I(.) is an indicator for the post-classification change period, which takes the value 1 for 
years where the refined DRG classification system was applied (from 2009 onward) and 
0 otherwise. I(.) is thus the pure impact of the 2009 DRG classification policy obtained 
an additional quarter of admissions. In private non-profit institutions a high level of admissions for
exploratory stays is also observed (59.89%). A portion of these institutions are cancer centers, which
mainly perform chemotherapy sessions, which are coded as exploratory acts.
4 Empirical strategy and results
4.1 Econometric models
In this paper, I check whether the refinement of a hospital stay cl ssification system leads to upcoding.
As mentioned in the Introduction, these data make it possible to “go back in time” and observe the
consequences of the change in the DRG classification. For the years before 2009, the data include not
only the diagnoses and exploratory procedures reported at th mome t of the stay, but also the associated
DRG according to the new (2009) classification. Therefore, the analyses here are based on the level of
severity that would have been associated to the stay in the new classification, before it actually came
into e↵ect. Analysis of data from this period is used to determine the trend in the percentage of low-
severity stays independently of changes in the behavior of health care providers due to changes in the
DRG classification. I am then able to examine whether, after the reform, the percentage of low-severity
stays is lower than the previous trend would predict.
The explained variable Yiht is an indicator of the level of severity of stay i at hospital h at time t.
Yiht = 1 if stay i is associated to a DRG of severity level 1.
Yiht = ↵+  1t+  2I(t > 2009) +  h +  h ⇤ t+  p + ✏iht (4)
• Temporal e↵ects are controlled by a trend variable t, coded from 0 to 5 (for years from 2006 to
2011). Any macro changes that are common to hospital stays are picked up by this trend coe cient.
The reference year is 2006.
• The e↵ect of the change in classification may also be explained by hospital-specific behaviors.  h
are hospital e↵ects.
• Some hospitals may change in terms of ctiv ty or size over the p riod. To control for this, hospital
fixed e↵ects crossed with the trend ( h ⇤ t) are also included in the regression model.
• As there may have been changes over the period in the practices recommended by physicians for
some pathologies which could a↵ect classification regardless of other incentives, I also control for
pathology e↵ects.  p are pathology e↵ects, which can again be either fixed or random.
12
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by controlling for any other changes over the period. viiThis effect may depend on 
hospital’s ownership status. To control for this, an alternative model is to include 
hospital’s ownership crossed with the indicator for the post-classification change period. 
• εiht is random noise. 
The linear models do not take into account the correlation between the different levels of 
severity. In the following, I therefore, used an ordered probit model controlling for the 
interdependency of coded severity levels. I define a categorical variable y ∈{1, ..., 4} indicating 
the observed levels of severity. The discrete probability function of y conditional on all 
explanatory variables is commonly specified as an ordered probit model. This latent variable y* 
is assumed to be generated by a normal regression structure. 
where y* is unobserved. What is observable is the coded level of severity y. ε is a normally 
distributed random term, with variance normalized at 1. Threshold parameters determine the 
estimates for different observed values of y. 
Besides, there are many reasons why upcoding behavior may differ across hospitals. There are a 
number of theories of the effect of hospital ownership on upcoding, but few consensus 
predictions (see Silverman and Skinner, 2000 for a comprehensive discussion). Several recent 
studies document this indirect channel. Duggan (2002) found that for-profit hospitals respond 
more strongly to financial incentives to treat indigent patients in markets with greater for-profit 
penetration. In the French context, the DRG classification changes were based on diagnoses 
rather than interventions. These DRG classification changes were then set up independently from 
• I(.) is an indicator for the post-classification change period, which takes the value 1 for years where
the refined DRG classification system was applied (from 2009 onward) and 0 otherwise. I(.) is
thus the pure impact of the 2009 DRG classification policy obtained by controlling for any other
changes over the period.12 This e↵ect may depend on hospital’s ownership status. To control
for this, an alternative model is to include hospital’s ownership crossed with the indicator for the
post-classification change period.
• ✏iht is random noise.
The linear models do not take into account the correlation between the di↵erent levels of severity.
I therefore used an ordered probit model controlling for the interdependency of coded severity levels.
I define a categorical variable y 2 {1, ..., 4} indicating the observed levels of severity. The discrete
probability func ion of y conditional on all explanat ry variabl s is commonly specified as an ordered
probit model. This latent variable y⇤ is assumed to be generated by a normal regression structure.
y⇤iht = ↵+  1t+  2I(t > 2009) +  h +  h ⇤ t+  p + ✏iht (5)
where y⇤ is unobserved. What is observable is the coded level of severity y. ✏ is a normally distributed
random term, with variance normalized at 1. Threshold parameters determine the estimates for di↵erent
observed values of y.
4.2 Results
Table 3 displays r sults of Least Square models. The chances that a stay would be coded as low-s verity
(Y ) decreased over time. This may indicate either increases in the severity of the health status of admitted
patients over time, or a learning e↵ect: hospitals adapting to the incentives of the T2A system. After the
reform, they coded comorbidities and diag oses as a whole in a mor exhaustive fashion. All else being
equal, the probability that a stay would be associated to a low-severity DRG strongly decreased with the
2009 reform of the DRG classification. This result is robust: the same result is obtained whether or not
types of pathologies, hospital fixed e↵ects, and hospital fixed e↵ects multiplied by the trend are controlled
for. Therefore, the coding behavior of health care actors was modified by the change in DRG classification
independently of any e↵ect on the actual production of care.13 Could the result be explained by more
12In the robust ess checks (Section 5), the model w run using a more r stricted sample from the 2008-2010 period.
13The only potential impact of the 2009 DRG change in coding on the actual production of care could have been through a
increase in the length of stay (see Appendix B). The empirical literature does not find support this assumption. A variety of
papers have found a decrease of the length of stay over the observed period (DREES (2012), Or et al. (2013), and Gobillon
and Milcent (2015)).
13
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the intensity of care, by construction. The responses to changes in classification were thus 
established independently of any changes in treatment. Newhouse (1989) found evidence that 
private hospitals shifted patients in unprofitable DRGs to public hospitals following the 
implementation of PPS. Silverman and Skinner (2000) found strong evidence of upcoding 
between 1989 and 1996. They found that for-profit hospitals upcode the most, and that not-for-
profit hospitals are more likely to engage in upcoding when the market share of for-profit 
hospital in their area is high. Dafny (2005) also found strong evidence of upcoding, a response 
that was particularly strong among for-profit hospitals.  
Public hospitals cover two very different groups of institutions. University hospital centres and 
regional hospital centres (research hospitals) are distinguished by their research and development 
activity as well as by their size. Thus, I distinguish between research hospitals and “other public 
hospitals.” As explained in Section 2, the French healthcare market also includes both for-profit 
and not-for-profit private hospitals. As a result, 4 types of hospitals are considered: Research 
hospitals, other public hospitals (except the research ones), non-profit hospitals and for-profit 
hospitals. 
 
Results 
Table 3 displays results of Least Square models. The chances that a stay would be coded as low-
severity versus higher severity (Y ) decreased over time. This indicates either an increase in the 
severity of the health status of admitted patients over time, or a learning effect: hospitals 
adapting to the incentives of the DRG-based reimbursement system gradually introduced from 
2004 to 2008.  
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All else being equal, we show a steeper slope of this probability with the 2009-shift of DRG 
classification. The probability that a stay is associated to a non-severe DRG decreases by about 
2.1% over the period. This result is robust: whether or not types of pathologies, hospital fixed 
effects (or hospital fixed effects multiplied by the trend) are controlled for, I obtain the same 
result. Therefore, the coding behavior of healthcare actors was modified by the change in DRG 
classification. viiiCould the result be explained by more intensive patient care? The answer is no, 
since severity levels are established exclusively on the basis of diagnoses and not treatment. 
Thus, what I show here is a coding of more severe patient diagnoses, attributable only to 
upcoding effects possibly due to a initial situation of downcoding. This change in coding 
generated no change in hospital production.  
I now present the results of the model controlling for interactions between hospital type and I(.), 
the indicator for the post-classification change period. The effect of the 2009-shift in DRG 
classification differs according to the type of hospitals. It appears that the policy makers’ 
decision led private for-profit hospitals to more massively manipulate raw information compared 
with other types (Table 3). The coding behavior of public hospitals changed to a lesser degree. 
Non-profit institutions fell between private for-profit hospitals and research public hospitals. 
Regarding public hospitals, “other public hospitals” were disadvantaged in comparison to 
research hospitals. 
-------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------- 
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I now present Model (2), the ordered probit model. From Model (2), I capture the presence of 
time invariant heterogeneity with a fixed effects procedure. Note that estimating such models 
with fixed effects typically introduces an incidental parameter problem. Here, because of the 
large size of the sample, one can estimate these models without having this concern. 
Considering the ordered probit model, the results are similar to those of Least Square models 
with respect to statistical significance.ix The reference is severity level 1, the lowest level. Note 
that a positive sign of any coefficients implies a higher probability of belonging to the higher 
category, corresponding in principle to greater severity. Controlling for types of pathology 
(Table 4, Column (2)), fixed hospital effects (Table 4, Column (3)) and fixed hospital effects 
multiplied by trend (Table 4, Column (4)) did not change the pattern of results. The probability 
of being coded as higher-severity increased with time. There was a sharp increase due to the 
2009 policy. The marginal effects indicate how the probability of level of severity changes with 
the 2009 change in coding for average individual.x I find that the probability that a stay would be 
coded as severe increased by about 2% after the reform (compared with before the reform), 
controlling for all of the independent variables (Table 5, Column (4)). Furthermore, as with least 
squares models, the change in classification led to a greater change in coding behavior in private 
for-profit healthcare institutions (Table 4, Column (5)). Non-teaching public hospitals changed 
their coding behavior to a lesser degree.  
 
These results clearly demonstrate a purely exogenous effect of a finer DRG classification leading 
to a upcoding, whether or not types of pathologies and hospital fixed effects were controlled for. 
The coding behavior of healthcare actors was thus altered by this DRG-classification shift 
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independently of any changes in the production of care. Also, these results clearly highlight a 
differential effect of a refined DRG classification system on the behavior of actors in healthcare 
provision depending on the type of institution.  
---------------------- 
Insert Table 4 and Table 5 about here 
----------------------- 
How to explain these results? As a fact, for-profit hospitals were more active with a very early 
use of coding optimization softwares in some for-profit institutions. More recently, University 
hospital centres have made use of such tools. Based on the theoretical and empirical literature, 
Silverman and Skinner (2004) advocate three potential explanations why for-profit hospitals 
were more active in upcoding using the Malani et ali (2003)’s simplified taxonomy of theoretical 
models of not-for-profit hospital behavior: i) the altruism model, ii) the signaling model, iii) the 
last type of model is based on evidence on the market interaction of hospitals with regard to 
upcoding. Focusing on the signaling model, if for-profit hospitals were able to increase marginal 
revenue through upcoding, they could force not-for-profit firms to compete through upcoding 
(for instance). To some extent, the altruism model may also receive empirical support. If non-
for-profit managers instilled a strong ethical norm (Horwitz, 2003), and these standards could 
extend to conservative billing practices, then it may explain why non-for-profit institutions 
upcode less than for-profit hospitals. Georgescu and Hartmann (2013) studied the effects of 
healthcare decision pressure from the hospital’s administration and from the professional peer 
group on physician’s inclination to engage in upcoding. They find that the source of pressure is a 
relevant predictor of physicians’ inclination to engage in up coding (from an potential initial 
situation of downcoding). What can we say about the situation in public hospitals? For these 
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hospitals, the pro-competitive reform that was introduced gradually from 2004 to 2008 implied a 
big change in managerial behavior that may be slowed down by the civil servant status of the 
hospital staff. Moreover, upcoding requires not simply administrators who direct coders to target 
profitable DRGs, but also physicians responsible for filling in the medical charts with the critical 
clinical information that can be used to claim the more generous DRG. There was no increase in 
physicians’ revenue that would have created powerful incentives to manipulate the raw 
information. 
This upcoding has direct positive effect on the payment received by the hospital.  
Above all, in a fixed-envelope mechanism, the value of the index depends on the total number of 
index units. A higher level of severity is associated to a higher value of ig. This situation leads 
automatically to a decrease in the value v of the index (Equation (1)). This in turn leads to a 
decrease in the lump-sum transfers associated to each DRG. This result has a number of 
consequences. 
• The “upcoding” led to a public budget reallocation that increased the share of budget 
allocated to for-profit hospitals, at the expense of non-research public hospitals. 
• As this mechanism leads to a tendency for any diagnosis to be coded at a higher level of 
severity, heterogeneity is shifted to higher severity levels. Thus, heterogeneity is shifted 
to higher-paying DRGs. This regulatory mechanism led to greater homogeneity in stays 
coded as not severe (severity level 1).  
 
Financial impact 
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I do not presume to give the exact financial impact of the data-manipulation on the hospital 
healthcare budget. data-manipulation means here to switch from a possible downcoding initial 
situation to a upcoding situation. However, I propose here a simple method to get an 
approximation of this amount. The additional budget computed is done for the year 2009. 
Context A, I consider the case where there is no fixed annual budget at the national level 
determined by the regulator. Data-manipulation then leads to an increase in the global hospital 
healthcare expenditure. Context B is a context where a fixed annual envelope is set up. In the 
French case, a fixed annual budget at the national level is determined by a vote in the French 
National Assembly.  
 
Being 2 hospitals, Hospital A with a funding x and hospital B with a funding y. With “data-
manipulation”, Hospital A now claims a funding x+α. Hospital B’s that does not “manipulate 
data”. We can see the hospitals’ funding as a percentage of the total funding.  
 
With Context A,   
• Without “data-manipulation”, Hospital B receives [y/(x + y)] % of the total funding 
• With “data-manipulation”, Hospital B receives [y/(x + y +α)] % of the total funding 
In absolute value, the hospital B receives the same amount whatever the behavior of the hospital 
A. This latter receives more budget. In relative value, the hospital B receives less in presence of 
data-manipulation from the hospital A. The global hospital healthcare expenditure can be 
expressed as Equation (6). With pop DRG-Li: population of patient coded as DRG level i; means 
fee DRG-Li: mean of fee for patient coded as DRG level i. 
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This data-manipulation is estimated to account for nearly 560 million euros in additional annual 
hospital healthcare cost, so approximately 1.4% of the annual budget countrywide.  
 
With Context B, the fixed-envelope is equal to x+y. 
• Hospital A gets a funding [(x+α)/(x+y+α)]*(x+y) = x+[(x+αy)/(x+y+α)] > x 
• Hospital B gets a funding [y/(x+y+α)]*(x+y) = y − [(αy)/(x+y+α)] < y   
 
The “data-manipulation” behavior of Hospital A increases the funding of this hospital by 
decreasing the funding of Hospital B from the same amount. The total budget for acute activities 
(T2A budget)xi in French hospital was around 40 billion euros. For the non-teaching public 
hospital, the cost of a lesser tendency to data-manipulation was 38 million euros.xii This amount 
appears to be quite not significant. However, here, we discuss on the budget of small size 
hospitals that already have financially to struggle to survive. 
 
Discussion 
The DRG basis prospective payment reform 
As the big shift in classification took place in 2009, the database includes periods both before 
and after the change in classification. I was thus able to study the effect of an exogenous shock 
on upcoding practices__ from a possible initial situation of downcoding__ with regard to 
severity. However, the T2A mechanism was applied to all stays in for-profit hospitals beginning 
in 2005, whereas it was introduced gradually to public sector hospitals between 2004 and 2008. 
A higher level of severity is associated to a higher value of ig. In a fixed-envelope mechanism, the value
of the index depends on the total number of index units. This situation leads automatically to a decrease
in the value v of the index (Equation (1)). This in turn leads to a decrease in the lump-sum transfers
associated to each DRG. This result has a number of consequences.
• The “upcoding” led to a public budget reallocation that increased the share of budget allocated to
for-profit hospitals; at the expense of non-research public hospitals.
• This regulatory mechanism led to greater homogeneity in stays coded as not severe (severity level
1). As this mechanism leads to a tendency for any diagnosis to be coded at a higher level of severity,
heterogeneity is shifted to higher severity levels. Thus, heterogeneity is shifted to higher-paying
DRGs.
4.3 Financial impact
I do not presume to give the exact financial impact of the upcoding on the hospital healthcare budget.
However, I propose here a simple method to get an approximation of this amount. The additional budget
computed are done for the year 2009. First, I consider the case where there is no fixed annual budget at
the national level determined by the regulator. The “upcoding” then leads to an increase in the global
hospital healthcare expenditure.
Additional budget = 2% * (pop DRG-L1) * [mean’s fee DRG-L2 - mean’s fee DRG-L1] (6)
With pop DRG-L1: population of patient coded as DRG level 1; mean’s fee DRG-L1: mean of fee for
patient coded as DRG level 1; mean’s fee DRG-L2: mean of fee for patient coded as DRG level 2.
I estimated “upcoding” accounted for nearly euros 560 million euros in additional annual hospital
healthcare costs, so approximately 1.4% of the fixed national annual budget.
Now, considering the real context where a fixed annual budget at the national level determined by
a vote in the French National Assembly. Considering 2 hospitals, Hospital A (with a funding x) and
hospital B (with a funding y), the global budget is equal to x+ y. With “upcoding”, Hospital A claims a
funding x+↵ but the global budget remains equal to x+ y. We can see the hospitals’ funding as percent
of the total funding. Considering hospital B’s that does not “up-code”, for sake of simplicity,
• Without “upcoding”, Hospital B receives y/(x+ y) % of the total funding
• With “upcoding”, Hospital B receives y/(x+ y + ↵) % of the total funding
Hence, in a context of a fixed annual budget and with “upcoding”, the fundings are the following:
16
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It was not until 2008 that the T2A mechanism was applied to 100% of acute care stays in all 
types of hospitals. As a robustness check, I here focus only on the period from the year 2008 
(before the 2009 policy change but when financing was 100% based on the T2A in all hospitals) 
to the year 2010 (after the change). This econometric analysis is thus conducted on a period of 
time where all hospitals were financed through the same DRG-based mechanism. The results are 
presented in Appendix A, Tables A1, A2 and A3. The results are unchanged. 
 
I now turn to the formalization presented in this paper. The description of the reimbursement 
system in Section 2 assumes that all hospitals are priced in the same way, but the formalization 
presented above is a simplification. DRG-based reimbursement follows the exact same logic for 
all sectors but there exists differences in the calculation of lump-sum transfers. The national 
health insurance system yields a fixed price for every DRG,xiii but there are two pricing grids: 
one for the public sector and one for the private sector.xiv As a consequence, prices do not 
converge, although there is competition between health care institutions in the two sectors. In 
this paper, econometric analysis is conducted controlling for hospital fixed effects crossed with 
the trend. Then, I control for this difference in pricing grids. 
 
In 2008, the percentage of financing based on the T2A prospective price mechanism reached 
100% of acute care stays, but the fee was corrected by a so-called transition coefficient which 
was specific to each hospital, and which was aimed at correcting inequalities due to the previous 
global budget mechanism. This coefficient was eliminated in March 2011. In this paper, first the 
coefficient was applied for the whole period of time of the data used. Second, econometric 
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analysis is conducted controlling for hospital fixed effects. Because this transition coefficient is 
specific to each hospital, it is captured by the hospital fixed effect. 
 
In the simple theoretical model used here, the same objective function is applied to all hospitals. 
This assumption is debatable. A more flexible assumption would be to introduce altruism 
coefficients: a specific altruism coefficient for each hospital type. Actually, in the econometric 
model, I opted for a more flexible framework, considering that hospital responses to 2009 policy 
may differ by hospital type. 
 
Yardstick competition works when the regulator can credibly commit not to cover hospital 
deficits, which is only partially credible in the French system. While the extreme scenario of 
closing an hospital due to deficits is not totally credible, getting into a difficult financial situation 
can have very severe and concrete consequences for hospitals: elimination of units or 
transformation into a long-term care center. It may also lead to postpone investments, to stop 
recruitment including not replacing leaving employees. 
 
Why not use a probit or logit model? Least-squares coefficients measure changes in expected 
levels of severity, while logistic coefficients measure changes in the log odds that the level of 
severity is equal to 1. The interpretation of a measure of changes in the expected values of the 
level of severity is direct. However, a probit model was also used to regress the model 
parameters (results available on request). Of course, the results of least squares and probit 
models are not directly comparable; however, the corresponding significance tests are. The null 
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hypotheses for least squares and probit models are identical. As Pohlman and Leitner (2003) 
pointed out, both models can be used to test relationships with a binary criterion.  
To take into account the correlation between the different levels of severity, we used an ordered 
profit Model. The constancy of threshold parameters is here assumed. However, we have to 
check whether the model violates the parallel regression assumptions or proportional odds 
assumption. In such a case, we should consider other models as a generalized ordered logit 
model. Table A5 presents the BIC’s test and the AIC’s tests. All of the tests agree that the 
proportional odds assumption is not violated with such large dataset. 
Ambulatory surgery 
Thus far, I have considered the four levels of severity. One objective of the French Health 
Ministry has been to encourage recourse to ambulatory surgery. Patients at a low level of 
severity, under specific conditions, are eligible for ambulatory surgery. The downward trend 
observed in admissions for stays coded as low-severity could thus have been due to the rise in 
ambulatory surgery. To give a general overview, Table 2 presents the distribution of hospital 
stays by hospital type for stays. In private for-profit establishments, more than 26% of stays were 
associated to day surgery, and more than 25% were associated to severity level 1. Stays with 
DRGs coded as ambulatory surgery represent between 5% and 7% of stays in the other types of 
hospitals. In Appendix A, Table A4 displays the results obtained with a set of stays associated to 
DRGs of severity levels 1 to 4 and DRGs for ambulatory surgery.xv 
The inclusion of ambulatory surgery does not change the previously observed pattern of results 
(Table A4). The change in the classification system negatively affected the probability of being 
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associated to a DRG of low severity versus a higher level of severity (2, 3 or 4) or day surgery.  
--------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------- 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis here is based on the level of severity that would have been associated to the stay in 
the new classification, before it actually came into effect. My focus is to assess how far the 2009 
classification change in coding offered hospitals opportunities to upcode; I also examined the 
role of hospital ownership status.  
The empirical literature on upcoding is almost exclusively focused on the United States. It is thus 
natural to ask whether upcoding is a US phenomenon, or whether it can be found in other health 
systems as well. This question is particularly important given that many countries have opted for 
a refined DRG classification system over the last decade. This paper examines hospital responses 
to changes in DRG classification in the context of a DRG payment system.  
As the single-payer public health insurance system strengthens financial incentives for hospital 
efficiency in healthcare production, this question is crucial. The DRG system of fixed prices at 
the stay level combined with a fixed national envelope for all stays in all hospitals creates 
incentives for hospitals in both the public and private sectors to increase the volume of 
admissions in absolute and to increase the number of diagnoses per stay to switch stays into more 
profitable in DRGs (higher level of severity).  
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This study illustrates how a simple change in the French DRG classification system in 2009 
generated large and exogenous changes in the coded level of severity of in-patient stays. 
Hospitals responded to this policy by manipulating the coding on patients to get DRGs 
associated to larger reimbursement. This practice is not an issue when coding practices are 
uniform across hospitals. Differential upcoding could be seen as attenuation in ‘downcoding” 
caused by more efficient billing systems. Here, the big issue is that the upcoding behavior differs 
in function of the hospital’s ownership whereas hospitals under the same reimbursement system, 
have the same incentive to manipulate the raw information. Therefore, we find support that the 
observed effect of a change to the DRG coding system is beyond a reduction in “downcoding” 
but rather an opportunity to manipulate the coding and hence, the data.  
Following the policy change, for-profit facilities availed themselves of this opportunity to the 
greatest extent. An implication of these results is that upcoding led to a budget reallocation that 
increased the share of total health spending going to for-profit hospitals at the expense of public 
non-research hospitals. I also find that the hospitals the least equipped with high-tech 
equipment—non-teaching public hospitals—were the least likely to engage in upcoding data, 
with corresponding negative effects on their share of total health spending. Taken together, these 
findings echo those of studies such as ProPAC (2005) and Scanlon (2006). According to 
Scanlon, DRG refinements favor research hospitals at the expense of smaller ones, mainly 
hospitals in rural areas. This may jeopardize the financial situation of the latter, which often 
struggle to remain financially viable.  
A second implication of these results relates to in-patients with low-severity diagnoses. I find 
that the propensity to code cases as high-severity increased following the implementation of the 
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policy in 2009. The French National assembly votes, every year, a fixed envelope at the national 
level. Because of this fixed annual envelope, this led to a decrease in the fee paid for patients 
with a low-severity diagnosis, for the same intensity of treatment.  
A third implication is on the use of number of relative units per DRG to measure the intensity of 
care. Upcoding practices artificially increase the intensity of care (number of relative units per 
DRG). As a result, number of relative units per DRG is not per se relevant to judge the intensity 
of care or services provided by the hospital. The refinement of DRG classification can be said to 
be useful as a mechanism for cost control, but it does not remove the need for a thorough 
auditing of hospital coding practices.  
As a general conclusion, the 2009 policy lead to upcoding (from an potential initial context of 
downcoding) disconnected from any changes in production lines. Therefore, these results are free 
of any effects on healthcare quality but it highlights the financial effects on hospitals and in 
particular, the negative impact on hospitals in rural areas. This research emphasizes the need to 
anticipate the impacts of any changes in the DRG classification on public and private-sector 
actions. Besides, a general comment here is how long French hospitals will be able to absorb the 
increase in number of admissions with a very short increase in the annual envelope. What are the 
implication in terms of healthcare and decision of discharge?  
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Figure 1: Trend by level of Severity 
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Table 1: Hospital ownership and severity level (%) 
Repartition of hospital ownership by severity level (%) 
 Low Severity Level: 1 Higher Severity Level:  
2, 3, 4 
 
All severity 
Research hosp. 32,80% 45,26% 36,19% 
Other pub. 
hosp. 20,77% 22,64% 21,64% 
NFP hospitals 9,30% 5,89% 7,11% 
FP Hospitals 37,13% 25,99% 35,28% 
Whole sample 100% 100% 100% 
Repartition of severity level  by hospital ownership (%) 
 Low Severity Level: 1 Higher Severity Level:  
2, 3, 4 
 
All severity 
Research hosp. 64,89% 35,11% 100% 
Other pub. hosp. 66,23% 33,77% 100% 
NFP hospitals 67,72% 32,28% 100% 
FP Hospitals 78,40% 21,60% 100% 
Whole sample 69,85% 30,15% 100% 
PMSI database, years 2006-2011 
Notes: Higher level of severity: Moderate (severity level 2), High (severity level 3), Very high (severity level 4) 
 
 
Table 2: Repartition of DRG’s type by hospital’s ownership (%) 
(%) 
Low Severity Level: 
1 
Higher Severity 
Level:  
2, 3, 4 
 
Death 
Research hosp. 30,55% 16,53% 0,23% 
Other pub. hosp. 28,07% 13,37% 0,19% 
NFP hospitals 17,07% 8,70% 0,06% 
FP Hospitals 25,59% 7,05% 0,03% 
Whole sample 26,94% 11,62% 0,13% 
(%) Ambulatory  
surgery 
Very short  
stays 
Exploratory stays  
and sessions 
Research hosp. 6,11% 13,99% 32,59% 
Other pub. hosp. 5,21% 17,44% 35,72% 
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NFP hospitals 6,95% 7,32% 59,89% 
FP Hospitals 26,87% 4,25% 36,21% 
Whole sample 13,71% 10,47% 37,12% 
PMSI database, years 2006-2011 
Notes: Higher level of severity: Moderate (severity level 2), High (severity level 3), Very high (severity level 4) 
 
Table 3: Least square model  
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Y : indicator for level of severity 1_Low Sample including stays with DRG of Severity level 1 to 4 
Trend   
-0.0098*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0078*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0074*** 
(0.0001) 
- - 
DRG classification changes (I(.)) 
 
-0.0216*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0213*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0213*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0210*** 
(0.0003) 
- 
DRG classification changes (I(.)) 
crossed 
Teaching hospital - - - - 
-0.0212*** 
(0.0004) 
Other Public hosp. - - - - 
-0.0178*** 
(0.0010) 
Non-Profit hosp. - - - - 
-0.0220*** 
(0.0005) 
For-Profit hosp. - - - - 
-0.0271*** 
(0.0005) 
Dummies 
Pathology NO YES YES YES YES 
Hospital NO NO YES YES YES 
Hospital dummies crossed trend NO NO NO YES YES 
PMSI database, years 2006-2011 
Notes: *significant at 1% level, ** significant at 0.1%, * significant at 0.01%.  
Model(1): Y= f(Trend, classification DRGs’ change)  
Model(2): Y= f(Trend, classification DRGs’ change, Dummies_pathology)  
Model(3): Y= f(Trend, classification DRGs’ change, Dummies_pathology, Dummies_hospital, Dummies_hospital crossed trend)  
Models with no dummy pathology include pathology random effect 
Models with no hospital fixed effect include hospital random effect 
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Table 4: Ordered probit model (Coefficients) 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Y : indicator for level of severity (from 1 to 4) Sample including stays with DRG of Severity level 1 to 4 
Trend   0.0336*** (0.0002)  
0.0309*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0300*** 
(0.0002) - - 
DRG classification changes (I(.)) 
 
0.0601*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0640*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0653*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0650*** 
(0.0007) - 
DRG classification changes (I(.)) 
crossed 
Teaching hospital -  - - 0.0630*** (0.00114) 
Other Public hosp. -  - - 0.0575*** (0.0009) 
Non-Profit hosp. -  - - 0.0772*** (0.0011) 
For-Profit hosp. -  - - 0.1069*** (0.0011) 
Dummies Pathology NO YES YES YES YES 
Hospital NO NO YES YES YES 
Hospital crossed trend NO  NO YES YES 
Cut-point 0.6446 (0.0003) 
-0.6682 
(0.0056) 
-0.6922 
(0.005619) 
-0.7134 
(0.0083) 
-0.7634 
(0.0068) 
Cut-point 1.3514 (0.0004) 
0.0837 
(0.0058) 
0.0780 
(0.0056) 
0.0699 
(0.0058) 
-0.0640 
(0.0068) 
Cut-point 2.1657 (0.0005) 
0.9414 
(0.0056) 
0.9531 
(0.0056) 
0.9138 
(0.0055) 
0.8804 
(0.0068) 
PMSI database, years 2006-2011 
Notes: *significant at 1% level, ** significant at 0.1%, * significant at 0.01%.  
Model(1): Y= f(Trend, classification DRGs’ change)  
Model(2): Y= f(Trend, classification DRGs’ change, Dummies_pathology)  
Model(3): Y= f(Trend, classification DRGs’ change, Dummies_pathology, Dummies_hospital, Dummies_hospital crossed trend)  
Models with no dummy pathology include pathology random effect 
Models with no hospital fixed effect include hospital random effect 
 
 
 
Table 5: Ordered probit model (Marginal effect) 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Y : indicator for level of severity (from 1 to 4) Sample including stays with DRG of Severity level 1 to 4 
DRG classification changes (I(.))   -0.0208*** (0.0002) 
-0.0208*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0207*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0207*** 
(0.0002) - 
DRG classification changes (I(.)) 
crossed 
Teaching hospital - - - - - 0.0209*** (0.0004) 
Other Public hosp. - - - - - 0.0177*** (0.0003) 
Non-Profit hosp. - - - - -0.0222*** (0.0004) 
For-Profit hosp. - - - - - 0.0289*** (0.0007) 
Notes: *significant at 1% level, ** significant at 0.1%, * significant at 0.01%. ; Standard Error obtained with Delta method in parenthese. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1: Least square model_Sample from year 2008 to year 2010 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Y : indicator for level of severity 1_Low Sample including stays with DRG of Severity level 1 to 4 
Trend   -0.0080*** (0.00007) 
-0.0078*** 
(0.00007) 
-0.0075*** 
(0.0002) - - 
DRG classification changes (I(.))  
-0.0240*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0229*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0218*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0214*** 
(0.0002) - 
DRG classification changes (I(.)) 
crossed 
Teaching hospital - - - - -0.0220*** (0.0005) 
Other Public hosp. - - - - -0.0178*** (0.0010) 
Non-Profit hosp. - - - - -0.0228*** (0.0005) 
For-Profit hosp. - - - - -0.0271*** (0.0005) 
Dummies 
Pathology NO YES YES YES YES 
Hospital NO NO YES YES YES 
Hospital crossed trend NO NO NO YES YES 
Notes: *significant at 1% level, ** significant at 0.1%, * significant at 0.01%.  
Model(1): Y= f(Trend, classification DRGs’ change)  
Model(2): Y= f(Trend, classification DRGs’ change, Dummies_pathology)  
Model(3): Y= f(Trend, classification DRGs’ change, Dummies_pathology, Dummies_hospital, Dummies_hospital crossed trend)  
Models with no dummy pathology include pathology random effect 
Models with no hospital fixed effect include hospital random effect 
 
 
 
Table A2: Ordered probit model (Coefficients)_Sample from year 2008 to year 2010 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Y : indicator for level of severity (from 1 to 4) Sample including stays with DRG of Severity level 1 to 4 
Trend   0.0312*** (0.0003)  
0.0306*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0300*** 
(0.0002) - - 
DRG classification changes (I(.))  
0.0610*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0659*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0657*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0652*** 
(0.0008) - 
DRG classification changes (I(.)) 
crossed 
Teaching hospital - - - - 0.0648*** (0.0009) 
Other Public hosp. - - - - 0.0571*** (0.0008) 
Non-Profit hosp. - - - - 0.0706*** (0.0009) 
For-Profit hosp. - - - - 0.9180*** (0.0015) 
Dummies 
Pathology NO YES YES YES YES 
Hospital NO NO YES YES YES 
Hospital crossed trend NO NO NO YES YES 
Cut-point 0.6389 (0.0007) 
-0.7489 
(0.0067) 
-0.7605 
(0.0068) 
-0.7624 
(0.0068) 
-0.7464 
(0.0068) 
Cut-point 1.3336 (0.0007) 
-0.0101 
(0.0067) 
-0.0035 
(0.0068) 
-0.0400 
(0.0068) 
-0.0638 
(0.0068) 
Cut-point 2.1583 (0.0008) 
0.8587 
(0.0067) 
0.8833 
(0.0068) 
0.8540 
(0.0068) 
0.8204 
(0.0068) 
Notes: *significant at 1% level. *** Significant at 0.1%. Dependent variable = 1 if patient’s stay is classified as level of severity j 
Model(1): Y= f(Trend, classification DRGs’ change)  
Model(2): Y= f(Trend, classification DRGs’ change, Dummies_pathology)  
Model(3): Y= f(Trend, classification DRGs’ change, Dummies_pathology, Dummies_hospital, Dummies_hospital crossed trend)  
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Models with no dummy pathology include pathology random effect 
Models with no hospital fixed effect include hospital random effect 
 
Table A3: Ordered probit model (Marginal effects) _ Sample from year 2008 to year 2010 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Y : indicator for level of severity (from 1 to 4) Sample including stays with DRG of Severity level 1 to 4 
DRG classification changes (I(.))   -0.0215*** (0.0003) 
-0.0213*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0211*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0211*** 
(0.0002) - 
DRG classification changes (I(.)) 
crossed 
Teaching hospital -  - - 
- 0.0220*** 
(0.0003) 
Other Public hosp. - - - - - 0.0173*** (0.0001) 
Non-Profit hosp. - - - - - 0.0226*** (0.0003) 
For-Profit hosp. - - - - -0.0288*** (0.0007) 
Notes: *significant at 1% level, ** significant at 0.1%, * significant at 0.01%. ; Standard Error obtained with Delta method in parenthese. 
 
Table A4: Least square model  
Y : indicator for level of severity 1_Low Sample including stays with  DRG of Severity level 1 to 4 and day-surgery 
Trend   -0.0080*** (0.0000) 
-0.0078*** 
(0.0001) - - 
DRG classification changes (I(.))  -0.0228*** (0.0002) 
-0.0212*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0204*** 
(0.0005) - 
DRG classification changes (I(.)) 
crossed Teaching hospital - - - 
-0.0220*** 
(0.0006) 
 Other Public hosp. - - - -0.0178*** (0.0007) 
 Non-Profit hosp. - - - -0.0226*** (0.0005) 
 For-Profit hosp. - - - -0.0271*** (0.0005) 
Dummies Pathology NO YES YES YES 
 Hospital NO NO YES YES 
 
Y : indicator for level of severity 1_Low Sample including all stays  
Trend   -0.0079*** (0.0000) 
-0.0078*** 
(0.0000) - - 
DRG classification changes (I(.))  -0.0218*** (0.0002) 
-0.0211*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0204*** 
(0.0003) - 
DRG classification changes (I(.)) 
crossed Teaching hospital - - - 
-0.0217*** 
(0.0006) 
 Other Public hosp. - - - -0.0176*** (0.0008) 
 Non-Profit hosp. - - - -0.0221*** (0.0005) 
 For-Profit hosp. - - - -0.0271*** (0.0005) 
Dummies Pathology NO YES YES YES 
 Hospital NO NO YES YES 
Notes: *significant at 1% level. *** Significant at 0.1%. Dependent variable = 1 if patient’s stay is classified as level of severity j 
Model(1): Yj= f(Trend, classification DRGs’ change)  
Model(2): Yj= f(Trend, classification DRGs’ change, Dummies_pathology)  
Model(3): Yj= f(Trend, classification DRGs’ change, Dummies_pathology, Dummies_hospital, Dummies_hospital crossed trend)  
Models with no dummy pathology and/or hospital include random effect 
 
Table A5: Information criteria 
 LL(null) Akaike’s information Bayesian Information 
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criterion criterion 
Ordered Probit Model - 3.42e+07 6.84e+07 6.84e+07 
Generalized ordered 
Probit Model - 3.42e+07 6.83e+07 6.83e+07 
Notes: Based on Model 2 
 
Appendix B: French DRG 2009-classification and DRG based payment  
 
1. Description of the new French DRG coding system  
2009-French DRG classification system is organized in a nested fashion. DRGs are coded by a 
series of 6 characters. The first two characters define the pathology; the third defines the type of 
medical practice (medical, surgical, or exploratory); the fourth and fifth characters define the 
subfields of a given pathology; and the sixth character defines the level of severity of which there 
are four. The level of severity is independent of the procedures performed on the patient.  
The “root” of a DRG consists of the first 5 characters in the corresponding code. There are 617 
root DRGs in 2009-classification. Among these roots, 76.2% (470) are subdivided into 4 levels 
of severity. In addition, certain DRG roots are not subdivided into four severity levels, or are not 
subdivided by severity at all. Moreover, there exist, in some specific cases, other types of 
subdivisions that replace or complement subdivision by severity (Manuel des GHM, 2012).    
This classification defines four levels of severity  
• Level 1: stays without associated complications or morbidity (ACM) belonging to a list 
validated by consultative and decisional bodies of the national health statistics agency. In 
what follows, this level is called low or non-severe.   
• Level 2, 3 or 4: The list of ACMs contains three sub-lists corresponding to three levels of 
severity. An ACM always belongs to a single severity level, which does not change. In 
certain cases, death can also play the role of ACM. In the grouping algorithm, the order 
of priority is as follows.  – Existence of an ACM and its placement at a given level (2, 3, 
or 4) ; – Patient’s age (<2 years, >69 years and >79 years) ; – Death if neither of the two 
preceding conditions is satisfied; – Duration of stay, which is a mandatory condition.   
• Other types of subdivisions  
• The letter ”Z” indicates an exploratory stay, with no coding of severity. These stays are 
almost exclusively chemotherapy sessions and dialysis sessions;   
• The letter ”E” indicates stays ending in death;   
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• The letter ”J” identifies ambulatory surgical stays (no overnight stay) ; 
• The letter ”T” corresponds to short stays, between 1 and 3 days. These must be 
distinguished from stays coded by a ”J”. These are almost exclusively medical stays.  
In the primitive 2009-classification of the coding system (before any marginal adaptive changes), 
used here, stays were classified into 2,192 DRGs.  
2. DRG prospective payment system  
DRGs are used as a tool to measure the relative resource requirements for hospital care of the 
population. Hospitals are paid a fixed price for each patient admitted in hospital. At discharge, 
every patient’s stay is assigned to one of the DRGs based on their routinely registered primary 
diagnosis. At each DRG is associated a weight reflecting the average cost of patients in the given 
DRG relative to that of the average patient reimbursed by the system (MedPAC, 2007). The 
price for each patient treated is obtained by multiplying the relevant DRG weight by a fixed 
monetary value. With the DRG system, hospitals are expected to reduce costs and under certain 
conditions, to incent increase in activity (Sicilliani, 2012).  
They were first adopted in 1983 for the reimbursement of care provided to elderly patients under 
the US Medicare Program. Since then, the development of DRG systems and DRG-based 
hospital payments has become an international phenomenon (Kimberly et al., 2008). In Europe, 
prospective payment based on DRGs was first introduced in Portugal in the late 1980s, and more 
recently in other European countries such as England, France, and Germany. The principal 
reason for the popularity of DRG-based hospital payment systems is that they are supposed to 
lead to eciency: reduced costs for the optimum level of quality.  
DRG-based hospital payment creates three main incentives (Cots et al., 2011).  
• One of the incentives of DRG-based payment is for hospitals to reduce costs per patient. This 
can happen through: i) reductions in lengths of stay; ii) reductions in the intensity of 
services provided; and iii) patient selection. Using French data, the empirical literature 
showed that in public hospitals both the number of cases treated and case-mix-adjusted 
production increased significantly between 2004 and 2009. This coincided with a 
decrease in lengths of stay (DREES (2012), Or et al. (2013), and Gobillon and Milcent 
(2015)).   
• The second incentive is to increase the number of patients: the reduction of the waiting list, 
splitting care episodes into multiple admissions, admitting patients for unnecessary 
services (known as induced demand), and improving hospital reputation. According to 
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DREES (2012), the volume of admissions increased by about 14,6% over the period 
2001-2009.   
• The third is to increase revenue per stay. Hospitals can achieved this using one of two 
strategies: (i) changes in coding practices, or (ii) changes in practice patterns. The aim of 
both strategies is to reclassify patients into higher-severity DRGs with a higher associated 
payment rate, a phenomenon known as “upcoding”. With the data used here, which 
includes 15 million observations, the effect of changes in coding practices can be isolated 
and assessed purely independently of all other incentives.  
 
  
From downcoding to upcoding:  DRG based payment in hospitals 
Carine Milcent (CNRS – PSE) 
	
	 44	
 
																																								 																				
i	In	Health	Economic	literature,	this	shift	is	named	upcoding.	
ii	Calculations	based	on	the	data	used	here	yield	the	same	results.	
iii	A	transformation	of	the	mean	cost	is	actually	used	
iv	The	French	reimbursement	system	is	discussed	in	Section	5.	
v	Agence	Technique	de	l’Information	sur	l’Hospitalisation	(ATIH)	
vi	Details	on	the	French	DRG	classification	are	given	in	Appendix	B	
vii	In	the	robustness	checks	(Section	5),	the	model	was	run	using	a	more	restricted	sample	from	the	2008-2010	period.	
viiiThe	only	potential	 impact	of	the	2009	DRG	change	 in	coding	on	the	actual	production	of	care	could	have	been	through	an	
increase	 in	 the	 length	of	 stay	 (see	Appendix	B).	 The	empirical	 literature	does	not	 find	 support	 this	 assumption.	A	 variety	of	
papers	have	found	a	decrease	of	the	length	of	stay	over	the	observed	period	(DREES	(2012),	Or	et	al.	(2013),	and	Gobillon	and	
Milcent	(2015)).	
ix	Table	4	for	coefficients	and	Table	5	for	the	marginal	effects.	Here,	the	marginal	effect	is	an	estimate	of	a	population-averaged	
marginal	effect.	The	reference	is	severity	level	1,	the	lowest	level.	Note	that	a	positive	sign	of	any	coefficients	implies	a	higher	
probability	of	belonging	to	the	higher	category,	corresponding	in	principle	to	greater	severity.		
x	Here,	the	marginal	effect	is	an	estimate	of	a	population-averaged	marginal	effect	
xi	For	an	overview	of	the	methods	used,	see	the	IGF	report,	French	Finance	Ministry	(2011),	
http://www.igf.finances.gouv.fr/webdav/site/igf/shared/NosRapports/	documents/2012/2011-M-056-01.pdf	
xii	 The	 effect	 of	 “upcoding”	 behavior	 is	 standardised	 on	 the	 basis	 on	 the	 non-teaching	 public	 hospital	 “upcoding”	 behavior.	
Then,	 I	 compute	 the	 average	 “upcoding”	 behavior	 of	 the	 other	 hospital’s	 ownership	 compared	with	 the	 nonteaching	 public	
hospital	 one.	 I	 multiplied	 this	 effect	 by	 average	 fee	 for	 patient	 coded	 as	 DRG	 level	 2.	 I	 then	 got	 the	 average	 effect	 of	
the“upcoding”	behavior	for	one	patient	coded	as	DRG	level	1.	To	get	the	global	effect,	I	multiplied	this	number	by	the	number	
of	patient	coded	as	DRG	level	1	admitted	in	hospitals	except	those	admitted	in	the	non-teaching	public	hospital.	
xiii	This	is	known	as	the	“tarif	opposable	de	l’assurance	maladie”	[enforceable	price	to	the	national	health	insurance	system],	
and	is	set	for	a	given	diagnosis-related	group	(DRG)	
xiv	The	base	 for	 calculating	 the	 costs	of	DRGs	differs	between	 the	 two	groups.	Doctors’	 fees,	 as	well	 as	 laboratory	 services,	
imaging,	and	function	tests	are	 included	in	the	calculation	of	cost	per	DRG	in	the	public	sector,	whereas	they	are	not	for	the	
private	sector.	These	prices	are	national	and	are	published	annually	by	the	Ministry	of	Health.	
xv	As a robustness check, I also ran a least squares model including all admissions to acute care units. The results 
were unchanged (Table A4).  
	
 
 
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
	
